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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-4033 
____________ 
 
CHRISTIANA ITIOWE, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NBC UNIVERSAL INC.; COMCAST INC.; 
Steve Burke; GE, Attn - Jeffrey Immelt 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-13-cv-04155) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 12, 2014 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 19, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Appellant Christiana Itiowe appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing 
her amended complaint with prejudice.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
affirm. 
 Itiowe filed an in forma pauperis civil action against NBC Universal, Comcast, 
and General Electric, alleging discrimination “in a public place of accommodation” in 
violation of her civil rights, and seeking $7 trillion in damages.  Itiowe alleged that she 
“started pitching TV shows to NBC UNIVERSAL (Bravo TV) development manager 
personnel … and pitched a TV show that introduced what happens to me and that’s when 
the act of disability discrimination happened…”  Itiowe was inspired to pitch her TV 
show “because of people attacking via bed bugs behind closed doors acting like they are 
helping me but truly are not being fake with their interactions …, those kinds of actions 
can trigger what happens to me as phony acts gets me sicker.”  The District Court granted 
Itiowe leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but dismissed her complaint without prejudice 
and suggested that she file an amended complaint containing sufficient allegations to put 
the defendants on notice of the claims against them, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).  See also 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).   
Itiowe then filed an amended complaint, in which she asserted that she pitched a 
TV show to Bravo and was given approval to continue pitching shows, but then she 
revealed her health problems to them, and after that Bravo development manager Chelsea 
Friedland advised her that her ideas for shows would no longer be accepted.  Itiowe 
disclosed in her amended complaint that she suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and 
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hears voices and sees things on a daily basis that to her are real, and that the stigma 
associated with mental illness is devastating, degrading, and hurtful.  She stated that she 
had signed a form agreement with Bravo’s legal department and Ms. Elizabeth Logun to 
have her ideas for television shows reviewed by Bravo staff, but then Friedland reviewed 
her idea and rejected it, and she stated that “I cannot for the life of me understand why 
she will advise that I should not pitch a TV show idea anymore whereas prior to that 
happening she authorized that I can work with the legal dept to pitch TV show ideas.” 
 In an order entered on September 27, 2013, the District Court dismissed Itiowe’s 
amended complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state 
a claim on which relief may be granted.  The District Court reasoned that Itiowe appeared 
to raise a claim of disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117, but because she was not an employee of the 
defendants, she was not protected by the ADA.  In addition, she had failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies with respect to her claim of disability discrimination.  With 
respect to her substantive claim of discrimination, the District Court reasoned that she 
had failed to allege a plausible causal connection between her paranoid schizophrenia and 
Bravo’s actions. 
 Itiowe appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our Clerk granted 
her leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised her that the appeal was subject to 
summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third 
Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  She was invited to submit argument in writing, and she 
has done so. 
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  We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Certainly to 
the extent that Itiowe intended to bring her claim under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, we agree with the District Court that she failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies.  A claim that one has suffered disability discrimination in the employment 
context may be brought pursuant to the ADA, but the ADA requires that a plaintiff 
pursue administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) before filing a complaint in federal court.  See Churchill v. Star Enterprises, 
183 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 1999).  The plaintiff who brings an employment 
discrimination claim under the ADA must follow the administrative procedures set forth 
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5.  See id.  See also 42 
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting Title VII enforcement scheme and remedies for ADA).  
“That procedure begins when a charge is filed with the EEOC alleging that an employer 
has engaged in an unlawful employment practice.”  Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California 
v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 359 (1977).  The EEOC then investigates the charge and 
determines whether there is reasonable cause to believe it is true.  See id.  If the EEOC 
determines that reasonable cause does not exist, it will issue a right-to-sue letter, which 
the plaintiff may then rely upon in establishing that administrative remedies have been 
exhausted.  See Burgh v. Borough Council of the Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 
470 (3d Cir. 2001).    
Although failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not affect the District 
Court’s jurisdiction, Hornsby v. U.S. Postal Service, 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir.1986), non-
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exhaustion constitutes a ground for dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief 
may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 
F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, although the District Court in advising Itiowe to file an 
amended complaint did not give her notice that dismissal for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies was possible, Itiowe was on notice of the requirement when the 
District Court dismissed her amended complaint.  She has submitted argument in support 
of her appeal and a motion to remand, and in neither of these items does she assert that 
she did in fact exhaust her administrative remedies.  Accordingly, dismissal of her 
amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was proper to the 
extent that Itiowe intended to rely upon the Americans with Disabilities Act.   
As the District Court noted, however, Itiowe did not allege that Bravo’s adverse 
action occurred in the employment context.  Instead, she referenced a “form agreement” 
with Bravo’s legal department.  If it was Itiowe’s intention to argue a civil rights 
violation on the basis of a breach of that agreement, she has no viable cause of action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because she did not allege racial discrimination.  See Brown v. 
Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001) (to state a claim under section 1981 
for breach of contract, a party must allege facts sufficient to show that she is a member of 
a racial minority, and that the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice.  Appellant’s motion to remand is 
denied as moot.  Appellant’s motion to seal is denied. 
